











































The attached material is posted on regulation2point0.org with permission. R E G
AEI Center for Regulatory and Market Studies
The Need for Greater Price Transparency in the Medical Device
Industry: An Economic Analysis
Robert Hahn,
This article was published in Health Affairs in November 2008.
*Robert Hahn is executive director of the Reg
Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. Keith Klovers is a consultant with and Hal Singer is an expert
consultant at Empiris, also in Washington.
E G -M A R K E T S C E N T E R
AEI Center for Regulatory and Market Studies
The Need for Greater Price Transparency in the Medical Device
Industry: An Economic Analysis
Robert Hahn, Keith Klovers and Hal Singer
Related Publication 08-10
November 2008
This article was published in Health Affairs in November 2008.
Robert Hahn is executive director of the Reg-Markets Center and a senior fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. Keith Klovers is a consultant with and Hal Singer is an expert
consultant at Empiris, also in Washington.
The Need for Greater Price Transparency in the Medical Device
Keith Klovers and Hal Singer
*
This article was published in Health Affairs in November 2008.
senior fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. Keith Klovers is a consultant with and Hal Singer is an expertExecutive Summary
Proposed legislation seeks to impose price transparency in the health care industry as a
remedy for increasing medical device prices. This paper analyzes previous attempts to mandate
similar price-disclosure rules in a variety of industries. We identify the economic conditions
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The Need For Greater Price Transparency In The
Medical Device Industry: An Economic Analysis
Mandatory price disclosure for implantable devices is unlikely to pass
a benefit-cost test and could increase consumers’ cost of care.
by Robert W. Hahn, Keith B. Klovers, and Hal J. Singer
ABSTRACT: Proposed legislation seeks to impose price transparency in the heath care in-
dustry as a remedy for increasing medical device prices. This paper analyzes previous at-
tempts to mandate similar price-disclosure rules in a variety of industries. We identify the
economic conditions under which mandatory price disclosure is likely to generate substan-
tial benefits and costs. Applying these conditions, we conclude that mandatory price disclo-
sure for implantable devices is unlikely to pass a benefit-cost test. [Health Affairs 27, no. 6
(2008): 1554–1559; 10.1377/hlthaff.27.6.1554]
A
number of health care policy ana-
lysts have advocated greater price
transparency as a way to empower pa-
tients and reduce health costs.1 According to
these analysts, providing more information
about the cost of a product or procedure to
the public would allow patients to make
more informed and cost-effective decisions
for medical care.2 Other scholars, such as
Mark Pauly and Lawton Burns, argue that
price information should flow freely between
hospital purchasing agents and doctors.3 We
agree. The issue we address in this essay is
whetherthegovernmentshouldcompelmed-
ical device makers to share their pricing in-
formation with the public. Here we examine
the advantages and disadvantages of manda-
tory price disclosure for device makers.
We restrict our analysis to one family of
products—implantablemedicaldevices—that
have received recent attention. Implantable
medical devices, such as implantable car-
dioverter defibrillators (ICDs) and coronary
stents, are typically provided to patients
throughsurgicalproceduresperformedinhos-
pitals. Setting aside the role of purchasers, the
initial purchaser of the product is the hospital
rather than the patient, although the patient
and the insurance company ultimately pay for
thedeviceandanyrelatedproceduresfromthe
hospital.
Many advocates argue that mandatory
price disclosure in this industry would benefit
consumers. Yet there has been no analysis of
whether the alleged benefits are likely to ex-
ceed the costs. To our knowledge, we are the
first to provide a rigorous economic frame-
work for analyzing the likely benefits and
costs associated with proposed legislation on
disclosure being considered by Congress.4
The Current Proposal
Legislation has been introduced in the U.S.
Senate that seeks to help hospitals lower their
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The Transparency in Medical Device Pricing
Act of 2007 would require medical device
makers to report the mean and median quar-
terly sales prices for each applicable device
model to the secretary of health and human
services (HHS). Price information would then
be posted on the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) Web site. To en-
courage compliance, the bill would levy fines
for noncompliance or for pro-
viding false or misleading
pricing information.
Although the bill is de-
signed to assist the ultimate
purchasers of medical devices
(patients), it might not have
that affect. The benefits and
costs of mandatory price dis-
c l o s u r ed e p e n do nt h es p e -
cific market conditions in the
medical device and hospital industries.
The Economics Of Price
Transparency
Todeterminethebenefitsandcostsofman-
datory price disclosure, we draw on other in-
dustries’ experience with similar mandates.
Specifically, we examined the effect of manda-
tory price disclosure on consumer prices. We
consideredsimilardisclosurerulesforhospital
services, groceries, cement, barge transporta-
tion, long-distance telephone service, and rail-
roads. From this analysis, we identified condi-
tions under which the benefits of disclosure
are likely to be large. We also identified condi-
tions under which the costs of mandatory dis-
closure are likely to be large.
A Mixed Record Of Success
Recent analyses have shown that manda-
tory price disclosure in other segments of the
medical industry can adversely affect consum-
ers. For example, hospital price transparency
regulation has recently been introduced at the
state level. Certain states—including Ohio
and South Dakota—now require hospitals to
disclosetheirchargesforcertainproceduresor
for their most common services or proce-
dures.5 Preliminary research questions
whether these arrangements may increase,
ratherthandecrease,consumerprices.Specifi-
cally, some scholars believe that because the
hospital industry is highly concentrated in
some markets, price disclosure may improve
hospitals’ ability to coordinate their pricing
decisions.6 Similarly, the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has found that disclosure
in the pharmaceutical industry may increase
consumer prices.7 This analy-
sis was specifically cited by
California’s Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger when he ve-
toed draft legislation that
would have imposed manda-
tory drug price disclosure in
California.8
Mandatory disclosure
rules have been found to gen-
erate unexpected conse-
quences in several other industries. We are
aware of four studies of particular interest.
First, Paul MacAvoy has found that tariff filing
requirements provided price signals that tele-
phone firms used to coordinate long-distance
telephone tariffs.9 As a result, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) em-
barkedonaprocessofderegulationthatended
all tariff filings (mandatory or voluntary) by
1996.10 Second, a review by Danish competi-
tion authorities found that cement prices rose
sharply after the authorities made cement
price data publicly available.11
Third, Stephen Fuller and colleagues found
that U.S. rail shipping rates declined by as
muchasone-thirdinthe1980s,whenrailroads
were authorized to keep shipping contracts
confidential. They concluded that contract
d i s c l o s u r ea n dp o s t e dt a r i f f sl e dt o“ r a t ec o o r -
dinationbytheoligopolisticrailroadindustry”
and thus higher shipping rates.12 Fourth, a
study by James Hong and Charles Plott found
that proposals to publish barge shipping rates
in the United States would induce higher
p r i c e s ,l o w e rv o l u m e ,a n dd e c r e a s e de f f i -
ciency.13 In each of these studies, mandatory
disclosure  rules  were  found  to  reduce  effi-
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industries.”ciency and increase consumer prices.
Yet there is also evidence that mandatory
price disclosure may deliver net benefits to
consumers. Specifically, a government-spon-
sored research project in Canada in 1974 sug-
gests that the weekly publication of grocery
price information substantially reduced gro-
cery prices in the study market (Ottawa).14
There are two caveats to the success of the
food price information program. First, con-
sumer benefits were dependent on continu-
ously updated information. Once the informa-
tion program ended, Ottawa prices rose to
levels comparable with those in the control
market (Winnipeg). Upon reviewing these
data, Dennis Carlton and Jeffrey Perloff con-
cluded that “to maintain low prices, informa-
tion must be continuously supplied.”15 Devine
and Marion also pointed out that the short-
run benefits of price information disclosure
may be different from the long-run benefits. In
particular, they noted that “in highly concen-
tratedmarkets,…theprogrammightbeusedas
an instrument of collusion.”16 That is, the pro-
g r a mm a yb eu s e dt oh e l pi n d u s t r ym e m b e r s
coordinate to set a price higher than they
could charge if they operated competitively.
The Net Benefits Of Mandatory
Disclosure
We define the net benefits of mandatory disclo-
sure a st h ed i f f e r e n c eb e t w e e n( 1 )t h eb e n e f i t s
to purchasers (in the form of lower prices)
from the receipt of added price information
a n d( 2 )t h ec o s t s( i nt h ef o rmo fh i g h e rp r i c e s )
that occur from both the provision of this in-
formation to sellers and the compliance costs
associated with additional regulation. For net
benefits to be positive, the benefits from im-
proving purchasers’ bargaining position (the
primarybenefit)mustexceedthecostsofarm-
ing sellers with information they could use to
colludewithoneanother (theprimarycost)as
well as the compliance costs imposed on busi-
nesses (the secondary cost).
 The conditions likely to generate
large benefits.Intheabsenceofincreasedop-
portunities for price coordination, mandatory
pricedisclosureislikelytogenerateimportant
benefits for final consumers (patients) in the
medical device industry if four conditions
hold: (1) search costs are large and may be re-
duced by disclosure; (2) disclosure provides
current price information; (3) competitive
forces would cause intermediaries (such as
hospitals) to pass cost savings on to their pa-
tients; and (4) there is a large variation in the
prices paid by hospitals for reasons unrelated
to volume discounts.
 The conditions likely to generate
large costs. The costs of mandatory disclo-
sure are likely to be large if such disclosure re-
sults in price coordination. As recognized by
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the con-
ditions under which collusion between firms
islikelytobeeitherachievedormaintainedare
as follows: (1) production is concentrated
among only a small number of firms; (2) there
are few other products that can be easily sub-
stituted for the product in question; (3) there
is a large degree of repeated interaction be-
tweenfirmsintheindustry; (4)thereisa large
degreeofproductstandardizationacrossfirms
in the industry; and (5) firms do not already
know their rivals’ prices.17 Although manda-
tory price disclosure may still generate costs
when one or more of these conditions do not
hold, those costs will tend to be larger when
all of the conditions are met.
Will Price Transparency Lower The
Cost Of Care For Consumers?
The extent to which mandatory price dis-
closure will deliver benefits in excess of its
costs depends on the structure of the medical
device industry. Here we examine how that
structure shapes the relative benefits and
costs of a mandatory price-disclosure policy.
Our examination focuses on three implantable
medical devices purchased by hospitals: ICDs,
coronary (both bare-metal and drug-eluting)
stents, and implantable orthopedics. Each
type of device generated more than $1 billion
insalesin2006.18Thesethreedeviceswouldbe
subjected to the mandatory price-disclosure
rules under consideration in Congress.
 Economics suggest that lower prices
are unlikely. T h es t ru c t u r eo ft h em e d i c a ld e -
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disclosure would not provide benefits to con-
sumers. First, search costs are mitigated be-
causehospitalagents,calledgrouppurchasing
organizations (GPOs), aggregate price infor-
mation across multiple device makers. GPOs
are widely used: approximately 97 percent of
U.S. hospitals report using GPOs, and GPO-
brokeredpurchasesaccount for 72–80percent
of all U.S. acute health care purchases.19
Second, mandatory price disclosure is also
unlikely to generate large so-
cial benefits because, accord-
ingtothelegislativelanguage,
the prices disclosed would
represent prices for the past
quarter rather than current
prices.
Third, market forces can-
not be counted on to ensure
that hospitals would recognize cost savings
a n dt h e np a s st h e mo nt op a t i e n t s .P a t i e n t s
face a concentrated hospital market in many
locales.20Thesehospitalswillhavelittleincen-
tive to share cost savings with patients.
Fourth, setting aside the role of loyalty and
bundled rebates, it is unclear whether medical
device prices vary for reasons unrelated to vol-
ume. TheU.S. Government AccountabilityOf-
fice (GAO) has demonstrated that there is
variance in medical device pricing. However,
theGAOnotedthatpricedifferencesvariedby
the size of the hospital involved, which sug-
gests that price may stem directly from the
volume purchased.21
 The costs may be significant. In con-
trast to the benefits, the costs of mandatory
disclosure are likely to be large. Specifically,
the structure of the medical device industry is
conducive to tacit price coordination because
the five conditions under which coordination
i sl i k e l ya r em e t .F i r s t ,m o s ts e g m e n t so ft h e
medical device industry are characterized by a
large degree of seller concentration. Most
drug-eluting stents are produced by one firm;
three firms produce ICDs; and five firms con-
trol 90 percent of theorthopedic joint replace-
ment market.22 The complexity of these de-
vicesalsodiscouragesnewfirmsfromentering
the marketplace.23
Second, for both safety and technological
reasons, substitution of related products is se-
verely limited in the medical device industry.
F o re x a m p l e ,d e s p i t et h ef a c tt h a tI C Dl e a d s
(which conduct signals from the ICD to the
heart) are reasonably standardized, surgeons
tend not to mix ICDs and leads from different
makers.24 In other cases, substitute products
a r em a d eb yt h es a m efi rm s . 25
Third, medical device manufacturers re-
peatedly interact. For exam-
ple, GPO contracts tend to be
rebid every three to five
years.26 Repeated interaction
can facilitate price coordina-
tion because it provides the
opportunity to successfully
punish firms that deviate
fromanagreed-uponstrategy.
Fourth, many types of implantable medical




Fifth, it appears that firms do not already
know each others’ prices.28 Specifically, GPO
transaction prices are not publicized and tend
to vary by contract.29 Contract pricing is a
closely guarded secret, as evidenced by ICD
maker Guidant’s successful lawsuit against a
hospital consultant who compiled confiden-
tial sales contract information.30
Accordingly, mandatory price disclosure
would likely provide firms with incremental
information that would allow better opportu-
nities for coordinated pricing. The benefits of
mandatory price disclosure probably pale by
comparison.
Recent Optimism Is Misplaced
Scholars such as Burns and Pauly have ar-
gued that price information should flow freely
betweenhospitals’purchasingagentsanddoc-
tors. They point out that this internal flow of
price information may help align hospitals’
and doctors’ interests and produce cost sav-
ings for hospitals. To the extent that such ex-
changes help doctors make more efficient pur-
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“In contrast to the
benefits, the costs of
mandatory disclosure
a r el i k e l yt ob e
large.”chasing decisions and do not inform rival
manufacturers of each other’s prices, this pro-
posal may be beneficial. Because it does not
deal with the external flow of information be-
tweenadevicemakerandthepublic,however,
it would not address the current public policy
debate.
Congress is considering a much different
form of price disclosure. The external flow of
price information contemplated in this pro-
p o s e dl e g i s l a t i o nw o u l dm a k ep r i c ei n f o r m a -
tion freely available to rival medical device
manufacturers. Accordingly, this proposal is
likely to provide medical device makers with
price information that is conducive to price
coordination or collusion.
In sum, the best economic evidence indi-
cates that it would be poor public policy to
mandate price disclosure for medical device
makers. Experience in several industries—in-
cluding the medical industry—suggests that
mandatory price disclosure for implantable
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